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Problem Setting
In October 1979, the anphasis of the Federal Reserve monetary policy
was changed from controlling the price of money and credit to controlling
relatively more rigorously their supply. With this change in policy
emphasis, the general level of interest rates, as well as interest rate
volatility, increased substantially (Figure 1) . The average level of
interest rates almost doubled within a six month period. Interest rate
volatility for the October 1979 through December 1983 period was greater
than for any prior period [Hegde, p. 1] . With increased variability in
interest rates, the risk of an unanticipated change is especially
significant to traditionally heavy users of credit such as farmers.
For many years, agricultural lenders obtained loan funds through
short-term deposits or borrowings and loaned the funds for both short and
long term duration at fixed rates. The lenders sought a margin sufficient
to cover operating costs, a profit, and risks associated with changing loan
fund acquisition costs. This method of lending worked well in periods of
relatively stable interest rates. However, with sharply higher and highly
variable interest rates, many lenders found that they did not have a
sufficient margin to cover the unexpected increased costs of loan funds.
Loans made at a fixed rate had been funded with money that had, over time,
higher costs than when the loans were made. As a result, lenders began to
use strategies which allowed them to adjust interest rates on loans as
1

3the costs of funds changed [Solverson et al, p. 51]
.
Several methods can be used to pass changes in interest rates to the
borrower. Shortened maturities on fixed rate loans provide a de facto
method of making loan rates more variable. If the loan is renewed, changes
in interest rates can be reflected in the new note. Loans with variable
rate provisions are also used. A variable rate loan is generally based on
some interest rate index, such as the prime rate, and neither the lender or
the borrower knows the exact rate of interest to be charged over the life
of the loan. The interest rate on the loan is the variable base rate plus
a fixed margin. A third method used by lenders to pass their increased
cost of funds to the borrower, is to incorporate a higher risk premium into
the fixed loan interest rate. The higher risk premium will potentially
offset increased loan fund acquisition costs that might occur.
There is evidence that financial intermediaries providing agricultural
credit have acted to transfer a main portion of their increased interest
rate risk to borrowers. Average maturities of all farm loans made by
commercial banks fell from 8.3 months in 1978 to 6.4 months in 1982, while
the number of commercial bank farm loans made with variable interest rates
increased during the same period from 17 to 39 percent [Board of Governors
1983, p. 37-38], In the 46 year period from 1933 through 1978, Federal
Land Banks changed the interest rate charged to farmers only 24 times. In
the 5 years following, 1979 through 1983, Federal Land Bank rates changed
14 times.
Agriculture is a capital-intensive industry. Debt for the average
farm on January 1, 1982, was approximately $80,000, while large farmers
(annual sales of over $100,000) had borrowings of over $336,000.
4Approximately 28.5 percent of U.S. farms had debt levels above $112,000,
however, these farms accounted for 87.4 percent of cash farm receipts
[USDA, 1983 (c) , p. 15] . Relatively small variations in interest rates can
translate into relatively large changes in total interest expense for the
average farm borrower. Fluctuations in farm commodity or input prices,
including interest costs, can easily eliminate the farmers profit margin
even though he may be a very efficient producer.
Commodity futures markets have long offered the farmer the opportunity
to minimize the risks of financial loss due to sharply rising or falling
prices for many classes of crops and livestock. Cnly recently has the cost
of money (interest rate) been viewed the same as other commodities. Prior
to October 1975 there was no financial futures contract. Today the
financial futures markets may offer the farmer a way to "lock-in" his
interest costs, thereby allowing him to avoid unforeseen and potentially
unfavorable fluctuations in his interest expenses.
Justification for Research
Recent literature has emphasized the potential for agricultural
lenders to use the financial futures market to protect themselves from
interest rate variability, and yet "price" loans to farmers at a fixed rate
that does not pass interest rate risk to the farmer [Drabinstot and
McDonely, Freeman, Moens, Solverson et al] . The problem is that
agricultural lenders have generally been slow to adopt financial futures
market technology as a tool for providing new loan options to farmers. A
1982 survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City indicated that just
7 percent of responding commercial agricultural banks currently were using
financial futures, while only an additional 15 percent of respondents
5indicated they would adopt their use in the future1 [Drabinstot and
McDonely r p. 22] . In a paper prepared for the Federal Reserve System
Agriculture Committee, Alan R. Tubbs, an Iowa banker, states:
"Some (rural banks) will investigate the possibility of
utilizing the financial futures market to hedge money costs and
eliminate interest rate risk for themselves and their
customers. This will be a very small percentage of the rural
banks. It is my opinion that most banks will not become
involved in futures transactions . . ."[Tubbs, p. 9-10].
Although the lending institutions financing agriculture may have the
experience and technical expertise available to protect themselves and the
borrowers from interest rate risk, indications are that many agricultural
lenders have not and will not make use of financial futures. Koens
provides evidence that financial intermediaries have acted to transfer all
or part of their increased interest rate risk to second parties [Moens, p.
33] . Hence, in many cases the farmer must either accept the increased
interest rate volatility or make use of financial futures himself.
As previously indicated, those farms generating over 87 percent of
cash farm receipts had debt levels above $112,000 in January 1982 and farm
debt has continued to increase since 1982. Several financial futures
instruments, including U.S. Treasury bonds and Certificate delivery GNMA's
(Government National Mortgage Association mortgage-backed certificates) are
traded on the Chicago Board of Trade with basic trading units of $100,000.
The growing number of farmers facing debt loads greater than this amount
iThe survey sample consisted of the 100 largest commercial banks in
agricultural lending volume and the top 10 percent in terms of farm loan
volume as a percentage of total loan volume. An agricultural bank is
defined by the American Bankers Association as a bank with at least $2.5
million in farm loans and/or 50 percent or more of its total loans in
agricultural loans.
would suggest a number of potential users exists. The implication that
many agricultural lenders will not make use of financial futures to reduce
the effects of highly variable interest rates on farm loans , coupled with a
potentially significant group of farmers able to effectively use financial
futures as individuals suggested the need for this study.
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to determine the feasibility ot farmer
use of the financial futures markets to "lock-in" interest rates.
Specifically, the relationships between Federal Land Bank (FLB) , Production
Credit Association (PCA) and Kansas commercial bank interest rates and D.S.
Treasury bond (T-bond) futures yields will be studied. Correlation and
regression analysis as well as analysis of variance procedures will be used
to examine farm interest rate hedging potential.
The specific objectives of this study are to:
1) Determine and evaluate variation in the basis for the following:
a) T-bond futures yields and FIB interest rates.
b) T-bond futures yields and PCA interest rates.
c) T-bond futures yields and Kansas commercial bank interest rates.
2) Discern whether the basis between the cash interest rate and the
futures yield is less variable than the cash interest rate.
3) Compare basis variability among the four T-bond futures contract
months traded.
4) Establish guidelines for effective farmer use of interest rate hedging
by:
a) developing optimal hedging ratios.
b) estimating the loan volume necessary for effective interest rate
hedging.
c) examining the effects of interest rate hedging on the interest costs
of a hypothetical Kansas cattle feeder.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Charming Farm Situation
There has been continuing change in the U.S. farm sector. American
farm labor productivity has increased to where each farmer fed 75 people in
1982, considerably above the 53 persons fed in 1972 [USDA, 1983(e) p. 58].
The size of the "average" U.S. farm increased from 240 acres in 1975 to 433
acres in 1982 while the number of U.S. farms fell to 2.4 million farms in
1983, down from 2.5 million farms in 1975 [USDA, 1983(b), p. 381].
But perhaps the most noted change has been the issue of increasing
farm debt (Figure 2). In 1950, total U.S. farm debt was $13 billion. It
rose to $53 billion in 1970, and then skyrocketed to $215 billion in 1983
[Production Credit Association, p. 13] . The Federal Reserve Board of
Chicago has predicted that total farm debt could surpass a trillion dollars
by the year 2000. Much could happen between now and the year 2000, but the
general trend appears certain. Farm producers will be handling
increasingly large sums of debt [Sabatka, p. 10]
.
Table 1 shows the "typical" U.S. farm's debt to asset ratio. This
ratio rose from 16.2 in 1975 to 20.6 in 1983. Kansas Farm Management
Association data permit a breakdown of loans to net worth ratios by farmer
age (Table 2) . This data show that loans to net worth have increased for
all farmer age groups between 1976 and 1982, but most notably for the
younger age groups. In 1982, farmers under the age 30 had an average ratio
of over 1.4 as compared to 1.1 in 1976. Farmers between the ages of 31 and
s6
I
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TABLE 1
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO U.S. FARMS,
JANUARY 1, 1975-1983
1975 16.2
1977 15.6
1979 16.1
1981 16.7
1982 18.5
1983 20.6
[USDA, 1983(e) p. 127-131]
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TABLE 2
LOANS TO NET WORTH RATIO BY FARMER AGE CATEGORY,
KANSAS FARM MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION MEMBER FARMS,
1976-1982
Age
Year Wider 30 21=25 36-40 41-45
82 1.41 1.17 1.00 .84
81 1.25 1.05 .89 .77
80 1.10 .94 .75 .60
76 1.10 .83 .75
Aqe
.60
Xsax. 46-50 51=55. 56-60 Over 60
82 .58 .53 .41 .24
81 .59 .50 .33 .24
80 .48 .38 .30 .21
76 .54 .41 .25
[Kansas Cooperative Extension Service]
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35 had an average ratio of 1.17 in 1982, up from .83 in 1976. Thus, data
indicate that the farmer is operating under not only an increased debt load
but also an increasingly leveraged position. Borrowed capital is becoming
more and more important in the farm operation.
But increasing farm debt does not tell the whole story. Along with
this increasing debt load, interest rates have risen dramatically. The
relative importance of interest as a percentage of all cash expenses has
almost doubled since the mid 1970 's [USDA, 1983(c) p. 33]. Interest
payable per acre of real estate debt has more than doubled in the period
1977 to 1983 (Figure 3) . In 1982, farmers as a group spent more than 18
percent of their gross farm income on interest. This was more than their
expenditures on seed, fertilizer, and pesticides combined [Production
Credit Association, p. 15]
.
From "traditional" interest rates of less than 10 percent, the prime
interest rate rose to 12 percent in 1974, fell to 6 percent in 1976, soared
to an unprecedented 20 percent in April of 1980, only to begin a rapid
decent a month later. By December 1980, the prime had climbed to a record
breaking 21.5 percent [Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a) , p. 1] . In 36
years, from 1935 through 1970, the prime changed 39 times and ranged from
1.5 percent to 8.5 percent. In the 12 following years, from 1971 through
1982, the prime changed 202 times and ranged from 4.75 percent to 21.5
percent [Freeman, p. 90]
.
Table 3 provides documentation of the increased variability in
interest rates paid by farm borrowers as measured by the coefficient of
variation. The coefficients for the period 1978 to 1983 for Production
Credit Associations, Federal Land Banks and all commercial banks are
12
a
1
ro h t
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significantly higher than the coefficients for either the 1960 through 1967
period or the 1968 through 1975 period.
TABLE 3
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION FOR INTEREST
RATES PAID BY BORROWERS
Time Period
f^nrlpr 1960-1967 5/ 1268-1975 sJ 127J=1283_
Federal Land Bank 4 8 14.4b/
Production Credit
Association 6 11 17.8b/
Commercial Banks 2 7 19.65/
VMoens et al
b/Monthly data provided by Farm Credit Bank of Wichita
£/Ftchl sample of Kansas commercial banks
FinanciaJ Futures Background
In 1975, the Chicago Board of Trade introduced the first interest rate
futures contract, a contract in Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) mortgage-backed certificates. In the first full year of trading,
GNMA futures contracts equivalent to $15 billion were traded on the Chicago
Board of Trade. Based on volume growth, GNMA futures contracts were one of
the most successful new contracts ever introduced [Chicago Board of Trade,
1980(a) p. 31.
In response to the success of the GNMA contract and to provide other
links to the cash financial markets, the Chicago Board of Trade introduced
futures contracts based on U.S. Treasury bonds in August of 1977,
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ninety-day commercial paper in September of 1977, certificate delivery
GNMA's in September of 1978, thirty-day commercial paper in Hay 1979, U.S.
Treasury notes in June 1979, and domestic certificates of deposit in July
1981. Futures markets options on U.S. Treasury bonds were introduced in
October 1982 [Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 4].
Growth in the trading of these contracts has been phenomenal. Some
23.7 million financial futures contracts were traded in 1983 (Figure 4)
.
Treasury bond futures were the most active financial futures contract,
posting a volume of 19.6 million contracts in 1983 [Chicago Board of Trade,
1983, p. 1].
The Chicago Board of Trade defines a financial futures contract as
follows:
Financial futures, or interest rate futures, describes
futures contracts based on financial instruments whose price
fluctuates with changes in interest rates. As with all
futures contracts, financial futures represent a firm
committment to buy or sell a specific commodity or financial
instrument, during a specified month, at a price established
through open outcry in a central, regulated marketplace."
[Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 3]
Each futures contract is standardized. For example, U.S. Treasury bond
futures contracts are based on a Treasury bond that has a $100,000 face
value, is not redeemable for at least 15 years, and has an 8 percent coupon
rate. Thus, when buying or selling a particular financial futures contract
it is only necessary to look at one variable - price [Chicago Board of
Trade, 1980(a), p. 3].
U.S. Treasury bonds are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade on points
and 32nds of par. Par represents full face value of $100,000. If the
price is below par, the bond is said to be selling at a discount. A price
of 90-25 means that the bond is selling at 90 and 25/32 percent of its face
FIGURE 4
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TOTAL CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT
CONTRACTS TRADED, 1977 TO 1983
Contracts (Millions!
2*_ 23.7
22
20 19.9
18
15.4
16
14
—
12
10
a.a
8
6
4
.5
1.5
3.6
2
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
[Chicago Board of Trade, 1983, p. 1]
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value or $90,781.25. Cn the other hand, if the price is above par, the
bond is said to be selling at premium. For example a price of 101-05 means
the bond is selling at 101 and 5/32 percent of its face value.
Bonds are referred to as "fixed income securities" because the term
defines a fixed annual income stream. A bond issued with a 6 percent
coupon pays 6 percent annually until maturity [Schwarz, p. 40] . It is
important, however, to understand the inverse relationship between bond
price and bond yield to understand how the financial futures market works.
As market interest rates rise the price of previously issued fixed-income
securities, such as bonds, falls (Figure 5) . This is based on the
principle that no one would buy a bond yielding 8 percent when he could buy
a new issue of the same quality that would yield 9 percent. Bonds with an
8 percent coupon will continue to be bought and sold at a discount such
that they also yield 9 percent [Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a) , p. 6] .
By using calculations for yield to maturity, it is possible to
determine what market price will bring the 8 percent coupon Treasury bond
futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade "into line" with
yields on the cash market. Tables are available from the Chicago Board of
Trade which easily translate bond futures prices into yield equivalents.
Yield equivalents are intended as interest rate reference points only.
Futures traders would not actually receive a bond yield unless they took
delivery on the contract.
Treasury bond contracts are currently traded with delivery dates in
March, June, September and December. It is possible to buy or sell a
Treasury bond futures contract that will not become deliverable for over
two years. For example, in July 1984 it was possible to have purchased or
FIGURE 5
INVERSE MOVEMENTS OF U.S. TREASURY BOND PRICE AND COMMERCIAL
BANK PRIME RATE, JANUARY 9, 1978 TO JULY 3, 1980
17
[Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a)
,
p. 71
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sold a Treasury bond contract for any of the following delivery months:
September 1984 March 1986
December 1984 June 1986
March 1985 September 1986
June 1985 December 1986
September 1985 March 1987
December 1985
Thus a user could have, established a price over 2 years in advance of any
actions that he planned to take in the cash market.
Hedging Background
The futures market has two primary functions. The first allows a user
to reduce his risk exposure to significant price movements in the inputs or
outputs of his business. This is referred to as hedging. A hedger either
buys or sells futures contracts to protect a later cash market commitment.
The second function of the futures market is to allow a user to accept
price risk in return for profit. This is known as speculating.
Speculators usually do not own nor intend to own the cash commodity. Their
willingness to accept large amounts of risk while speculating on favorable
future price movements helps provide a liquid market in which selling and
buying can be accomplished with relative ease [Chicago Board of Trade,
1980(b), p. 8-9].
Interest rate hedging is the act of taking a position in the financial
futures market that is intended as a temporary substitute for the sale or
purchase of the actual financial instrument in the cash market. The two
markets are expected to act in such a way that any loss realized in one
market is offset by an equivalent gain in the other [Chicago Board of
19
Trade, 1982, p. 80]. The purpose of the hedging transaction is to shift
the interest rate risk to others who are willing to bear this risk. If the
hedge is successful, the hedger (borrower) would be relieved of price risk
[Solverson et al, p. 52].
There are two basic types of hedges to be considered. The first, the
short or sell hedge, is the sale of a futures contract today as a temporary
substitute for the sale of the actual commodity at a future date. The
second type of hedge is the long or buy hedge. The long hedge is the
purchase of futures contracts today as a temporary substitute for the
purchase of the actual commodity at a future date [Chicago Board of Trade,
1982, p. 79, 81] . The following examples of short and long hedges using
financial futures clarify the nature of these transactions.
The Short Hedge . On October 1, a bond dealer is holding SI million of
twenty-year 8 3/4 percent Treasury bonds priced at 94-26 (yielding 9.25
percent) . To protect current holdings from an expected rise in interest
rates and therefore, a decline in portfolio value, a short hedge is
executed. Ten December2 Treasury bond futures contracts are sold at 86-28.
Since each U.S. Treasury bond futures contract has a face value of
$100,000, ten futures contracts are required to equal the $1,000,000 of
current holdings to be protected.
By October 31, interest rates have risen and bond prices have dropped
in response to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors' action. The bond
dealer offsets the previous futures sale by purchasing ten December U.S.
^Hedges are placed using the T-bond futures contract that will be the
nearby contract when the hedge is offset. In this example the hedge was
lifted in October. The December contract is the nearby contract.
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Treasury bond futures contracts at 79-26. A gain of $7,062.50 is made on
each contract, or $70,625.00 on the ten contracts.
Cash market bond prices have fallen to 86-16 (yielding 10.29 percent),
making the dealer's inventory worth $83,125.00 less. But this loss is
partially offset by the $70,625.00 gain in the futures market. 3 By
hedging, the bond dealer reduced losses associated with holding the cash
position from $83,125 to $12,500.
Cash Market Futures Market
October 1
Holds $1 million 20-year 8 3/4%
Treasury bonds priced at
94-26 (yield 9.25%)
Value = $948,125.
October 31
Prices for bonds fall to
86-16 (yield 10.29%)
Value = $865,000.
Sells 10 Treasury bond
futures contract at 86-28
Value = $868,750.
Buys 10 U.S. Treasury bond
futures at 79-26
Value = 798,125.
Loss: $83,125.00 Gain: $70,625.00
[Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 43-44]
The Long Hedge . Consider an institutional investor in Treasury bonds.
He may be the manager of a pension fund, trust fund or college endowment.
On April 1, 1980, he expects that in three months (July) he will receive
$1,000,000 - an amount which he plans to invest in Treasury bonds.
Interest rates have been steadily rising but the manager suspects that
rates are at or near their peak. Twenty-year 8 1/4 percent Treasury bonds
are yielding 12.26 percent. The manager wants to take advantage of today's
3The cash loss was not perfectly offset by the futures market gain.
This is due to changes in the basis, which will be discussed later.
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higher yield level, in case it falls in the course of the next three
months. His first step is to "go long" (buy) ten September T-bond futures
contracts. He purchases the contracts at the current price of 68-10. By
July 2, interest rates have dropped and/ accordingly/ the price of bonds
has risen. He sells his ten futures contracts ("lifts his hedge") at
80-07, for a profit of $11,906.25 on each contract ($119,062.50 for the ten
contracts) . Ihe price of Treasury bonds has increased from 68-14 to 82-13.
This translates into an opportunity loss of $139,688.50 for the bond
portfolio - but this loss is offset by a gain in the futures market of
$119,062.50.
Cash Market Futures Market
5E32H
Wants to take advantage of today's Buys 10 September bond futures
higher yield level on 20-year 8 1/** contracts at 68-10
Treasury bonds at 68-14 Value = $683,125.
Value = $684,375.
July 2
Buys $1 million of 20-year 8 1/4% Sells 10 September bond
futures
Treasury bonds at 82-13 (yielding 10.14) contracts at 80-07
Value = $824,063.50 Value = $802,187.50
Loss: $139,688.50 Gain: $119,062.50
[Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 42]
Gcoss-Hedging
Since financial futures contracts do not exist for loans and mortgages
associated with agricultural lending, we must use a cross-hedge.
Cross-hedging involves matching a loan at interest rates determined in the
cash market with a financial futures contract at a price, and hence yield,
determined in a different but related market. Such a hedge is based on the
22
premise that, while the two instruments are not the same, their prices
correlate. Die protection gained by cross-hedging is better than having no
protection from price risk in the cash position [Chicago Board of Trade,
1980(a), p. 45].
For cross-hedging to be effective, the movements of the cash market
and the financial futures market must be highly correlated [Moens, p. 56].
Hedge argues that the growing trading volume in the financial futures
markets, which resulted frcm increased level and volatility of cash market
interest rates, has significantly strengthened the correlations between
cash and futures prices. By comparing the R-squares for a period of
relatively low level and volatility of interest rates (January 1979 to
September 1979) with those from a period of relatively high level and
volatility (October 1979 to June 1980) , Hegde provides evidence that the
hedging and cross-hedging effectiveness of financial futures markets
improved with the generally rising level and volatility of cash market
interest rates. R-squares rose significantly for both deliverable and
non-deliverable cash securities [Hegde, p. 345, 348].
The following is an example of a short cross-hedge using Treasury bond
futures to offset corporate bond price risk. A pension fund has a
diversified portfolio of high-grade corporate bonds with a face value of S5
million, an average maturity of twenty years, and a current market value of
$3,673,437.50 on January 2. The pension fund manager wants to protect the
value of the portfolio from a possible rise in interest rates. There is no
corporate bond futures market in which to hedge this risk, so he sells
fifty June Treasury bond futures at 81-20 in the U.S. Treasury bond futures
market.
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By March 14, interest rates have risen, and the manager decides to
sell the corporate bonds. Be sells the bonds at $3,220,312.50, sustaining
a $453,125.00 loss. He buys back fifty U.S. Treasury bond futures at 69-20
and gains $600,000.00.
Cash Market Futures Market
January 2
Holds $5 million high-grade corporate Sells 50 U.S. Treasury bond
bonds with a market value of $3,673,437.50 contracts at 81-20
(a price of 73-15 per bond) Value = $4,081,250.
March 14
Value of bonds declines to Buys 50 U.S. Treasury bond
$3,220,312.50 (a price of 64-13 per bond) contracts at 69-20
Value = $3,481,250.
Loss: $453,125.00 Gain: $600,000.00
[Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 45-46]
If, in the preceding examples, the price of the instrument being
hedged had moved at the same rate as the price of the futures contract, the
cash market losses (gains) would have been perfectly offset by futures
market gains (losses) . The perfect hedge would have resulted. The perfect
hedge, however, occurs rarely in actual practice. Any change in the basis
during the time the hedge is held will result in a gain or loss depending
on the direction of the change. The basis is defined as the cash market
interest rate minus the futures contract yield. Changes in the basis,
resulting from differing rates of movement of the cash and futures
instrument, result in imperfect hedges as observed in the preceding
examples. To successfully hedge or cross-hedge, an understanding of the
basis and basis risk is important.
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Bflfiis Background.
Cash and futures prices tend to move in the same direction, in roughly
parallel patterns (Figure 6) . These prices move in parallel because both
are influenced by the same economic conditions and because the possibility
of delivery exists in the futures market, but also because market
participants engage in cash/futures arbitrage [Chicago Board of Trade,
1980(a), p. 38J.
Arbitrage, involves buying in one market and immediately selling in
another market at a profit. In addition to allowing the arbitrageur to
profit from distortions in usual price relationships, this action tends to
bring prices back "into line". As a result of arbitrage, the futures price
remains relatively close to the cash price. Wardrep and Buck assert that
cash and futures prices do not always move exactly together but it is
unusual for them to move in substantially different directions [Wardrep and
Buck, p. 249]
.
Basis can be either positive or negative depending on relative
cash/futures price magnitudes. Basis is said to weaken if it becomes less
positive or more negative and to strengthen if it becomes more positive or
less negative [Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 40]. If the basis
weakens on a short hedge (the futures yield advances relative to the cash
market interest rate) , a basis gain occurs. If the basis strengthens on a
short hedge (the cash market rate advances relative to the futures yield)
,
a basis loss occurs [Solverson et al, p. 52] . If the basis change is less
than the change in spot (cash) prices, the futures markets are a useful
tool for reducing the risk of holding that spot position [Wardrep et al, p.
249].
FIGURE 6
PARALLEL PATTERNS OF CASH MARKET U.S. TREASURY BOND PRICE
AND FUTURES MARKET U.S. TREASURY BOND PRICES,
JANUARY 1982 TO JULY 1982
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Moens suggests examining the standard deviations in yields and basis
to test the potential for cross hedging in a particular market and
recommends that a "good" cross-hedge might be completed if the standard
deviation of the basis is considerably less than the standard deviation of
the yields. His research provides evidence that the standard deviations
for basis between Federal Land Bank (FLB) bond yields and GNMA futures
contracts are significantly lower than the standard deviations on the
yields of FLB bonds [Moens, p. 76]
.
Optimal Hedoino Ratio and Hedging Effectiveness
Basis variations imply different rates of price change for the cash
interest rate and futures market yield. Hedging eliminates price risk, but
leaves the hedger open to the risks associated with changes in basis. It
is, however, possible to establish a hedge that will minimize basis risk.
Using regression analysis, it is possible to determine if there is a
relationship in price movements. This relationship tells the size of the
futures market position needed to offset the variation in a cash position
and is known as the optimal hedging ratio. Kuberek and Pefley suggest that
the slope coefficient (Beta) from ordinary least squares regression (OLS)
is a best-linear-unbiased estimator for the optimal hedge ratio and that
the regression R-square statistic provides an estimate of hedging
effectiveness; a perfect hedge would have an H-square of 1, while the
R-square would equal zero if the hedge was completely ineffective [Kuberek
and Pefley, p. 349-350] . Using the optimal hedging ratio will minimize
basis risk [Leuck and Leuthold, p. 3]
.
Cross-Hedging St-nriips
In 1983 Kuberek and Pefley outlined a procedure for evaluating the
cross-hedging effectiveness of interest rate futures and applied the
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procedure to the use of Treasury bond futures to hedge the interest rate
risk of corporate debt [Kuberek and Pefley] . OLS regressions were
performed on returns from corporate bond portfolios and T-bond futures
contracts. The resulting sample coefficients of determination (regression
H-square statistics) provided estimates of hedging effectiveness.
Kuberek and Pefley suggest that T-bond futures offer substantial
protection from unexpected changes in corporate bond prices. The degree of
hedging effectiveness , however/ depends on both the quality of bonds being
hedged and the maturity of the specific futures contract chosen in
constructing the hedge. T-bond futures were found to be more effective in
hedging high quality corporate debt (MA of M rated bonds) than
lower-quality corporate debt (A rated bonds) . Nearby futures contracts
exhibited superior hedging effectiveness than more distant futures
contracts regardless of the quality of debt being hedged.
Leuck and Luethold examined one sector of agriculture, grain storage,
and analyzed the use of the financial futures markets in developing
selective hedging strategies for reducing interest rate risk on variable
rate elevator debt [Leuck and Luethold] . United States Treasury bill
(T-bill) futures contracts were used to hedge the prime rate (private
elevator debt) and Bank for Cooperative (BC) seasonal loan rate
(cooperative elevator debt) . Several hedging strategies were examined for
four elevator size classes. The minimum size elevator that could
effectively use T-bill futures contracts to hedge had a minimum annual
grain volume of 2.7 million bushels and a minimum storage capacity of 2.0
million bushels. The benefits of hedging were greater for private
elevators than for cooperative elevators. The results of this study
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indicate that hedging strategies can work to reduce interest rate risk on
variable rate loans held by elevators and further, that this risk reduction
can take place before or during the time debt is actually held.
Moens studied the potential for agricultural lenders to cross-hedge
their loan fund costs on the financial futures using (2WA or T-bill futures
contracts [Moens] . Correlation and regression analysis, and the comparison
of standard deviations of yields on Farm Credit System bonds with the
standard deviation of the basis between such bonds and futures market
yields were used to analyze cross-hedging potential. Results of these
tests indicated that GNMA futures contracts offered a better vehicle for
cross-hedging agricultural lender fund costs than did T-bill futures
contracts. Based on these results, actual cross-hedging examples using
QMA futures contracts were constructed for Federal Land Bank and Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank bond issuances. Moens concluded that these
cross-hedges provided a partial offset of opportunity losses incurred and
suggested that the potential for agricultural lenders to cover interest
rate volatility through the use of the financial futures does exist.
The preceding studies indicate that the use of the financial futures
in establishing cross-hedges does offer potential interest rate risk
reduction for several different institutions. However, very little
research has been directed to the use of financial futures to reduce
interest rate risk for primary agriculture i.e., the farm borrower.
CHAPTER HI
FEASABILITY OF FARMER INTEREST RATE HEDGING
Hedging Instrument
The financial futures contract selected for the hedging of interest
rate risk in this study is the United States Treasury bond (T-bond) futures
contract as traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. Financial futures
contracts are currently being traded on other markets such as the
MidAmerica Commodity Exchange and the International Monetary Market (IMM)
at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. In this study it is the Chicago Board
of Trade and the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange which provide the market
mechanism for T-bond futures contracts.
The decision to use T-bond futures contracts was based on both the
size of futures contracts and the liquidity of the markets in which they
are traded. When considering the development of an interest rate hedging
program for a farmer, it is necessary to match the farmers debt load with
the futures contract size plus be sure there is sufficient market liquidity
to facilitate timely buy and sell transactions.
As indicated in the preceding chapter, approximately 28.5 percent of
U.S. farmers have debt loads of over $112,000, while the average farms debt
on January 1, 1982 was about $80,000. There are some individual farmers
with debt loads of over a million dollars. However, the use of the
$1,000,000 U.S.Treasury bill futures contract or the $1,000,000 Domestic
Certificate of Deposit futures contract is precluded from this study as
being too large for use in establishing interest rate hedges for the
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majority of farmers, Cn the other hand, U.S. Treasury bond, U.S. Treasury
Note, Certificate Delivery C2JMA and CDR4 GNMA futures contracts are all
traded in $100,000 increments [Chicago Board of Trade 1980(a), p. 20, 26].
The $100,000 face value of these futures contracts more nearly matches the
average farmers debt load than does the $1,000,000 face value of the larger
futures contracts.
T-bond futures contracts were chosen from this group based on market
liquidity. A liquid market is one where buying and selling can be done-
with ease, due to the presence of a large number of interested buyers and
sellers willing and able to trade substantial quantities at small price
differences [Chicago Board of Trade, 1982, p. 80] . T-bond futures are
traded in a highly liquid market on the Chicago Board of Trade as evidenced
by the 16 million T-bond futures contracts traded out of a total of 23.7
million financial futures contracts traded in 1983 [Chicago Board of Trade,
1983, p. 1]. In addition, T-bond futures can be purchased as $50,000
"mini" contracts on the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange. This potentially
offers the smaller borrower, or borrowers who only want to "lock in" rates
on part of their debt, an opportunity to hedge their interest rate risk. 5
Cash Tnghrimpnt-g
When developing a borrowing program, the agricultural producer has
several options as to the interest rate structure and loan maturity that
best fit his way of doing business. There also exist different sources of
loan funds. The cash market instruments chosen for studying the potential
4Collateralized depository receipt
5Although there are minor discrepancies in T-bond futures prices
between the Chicago Board of Trade and the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange,
arbitrage would tend to keep these two markets parallel in price.
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of interest rate hedging were commercial banks, Production Credit
Associations (PCA) and Federal Land Banks (FIB) . These lenders offer the
farmer a wide range of options.
FLB's primarily offer long-term, variable rate, real estate loans.
FLB loans to farmers are made for terms of 5 to 40 years. Most of these
loans are amortized over the lending period.
PCA's make loans to farmers for almost any purpose, but limit loan
maturity to a maximum of 7 years. Short-term operating loans are usually
made with maturities that coincide with the normal marketing season of the
enterprise being financed. The intermediate-term loan is usually amortized
over the useful life of the item(s) being financed, but in special cases,
intermediate-term loans with balloon payments at maturity may be arranged.
Commercial banks offer the farmer additional financing alternatives.
The most important type of loan made to farmers by commercial banks (money
center banks and rural banks) is production loans to provide funds for
current farm operations. 6 Intermediate-term and real estate loans are also
made. The maturity of farm loans made by commercial banks varies
considerably with the purpose of the loan. Current operating loans are
generally payable when the cash flow generated by the operation is
received. Notes for intermediate-term loans may be written with 3 or 4
year maturities. Many intermediate-term loans, however, are written with
maturities of one year or less, but with a mutual understanding between the
lender and the borrower that the note will be extended at maturity [Nelson
et al, p. 330]
.
6Approximately 69 percent of the number of loans made by commercial
banks in 1983 were for feeder livestock or current operating expenses
[Board of Governors, 1983, Table 335. Q]
.
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In 1983 the largest holders of agriculture's non-real estate debt were
ccnmercial banks. Commercial banks held 34 percent of non-real estate farm
debt while PCA's supplied an additional 19 percent of the credit. FIB's
financed the largest share of agriculture's real estate debt at 43 percent
while ccnmercial banks held 8 percent [USDA, 1984(a), p. 2, 3]. Figure 7
shows a historical breakdown of United States farm debt by holder.
The Data
Futures Yields . Monthly average Chicago Board of Trade T-bond futures
contract prices were determined for the four nearby months for each of the
four futures contract months currently being traded (March, June,
September, and December contracts) with an overlap of one month. Figure 8
shows the tine scheme under which T-bond price data were gathered. For
example, the price for the June 1978 contract as it traded in March 1978,
April 1978, May 1978 and the delivery month of June 1978 initiated the data
set. Prices for the September 1978 contract as it traded in June, July,
August and the delivery month of September 1978 were then determined.
Similar data were obtained through the March 1984 T-bond contract.
Averages were calculated using daily closing prices for the period 1978
through March 1984.7 Yield equivalents were determined using tables based
upon 8 percent 20 year bonds [Chicago Board of Trade, 1983]
.
During the study period, monthly average T-bond yields ranged from a
low of 8.3 percent on the September 1978 contract in June 1978, to a high
of 14.5 percent on the December contract in October 1981. Figure 9 shows
nearby T-bond yields for the study period.
7Although T-bond futures trading was initiated in August 1977, it was
not until trading of the June contract in March of 1978 that trading volume
reached a level that insured market liquidity. 1,000 contracts in open
interest was used as a measure of market liquidity.
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FIGURE 8
TIME SCHEME FOR U.S. TREASURY BOND
FUTURES PRICE COLLECTION
December
Contract
September
Contract
June
Contract
March
Contract
M J J
Month
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FIGURE 9
MONTHLY AVERAGE YIELDS OF NEARBY CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE U.S.
TREASURY BOND FUTURES CONTRACTS, MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
1 n.5-
E
II .0-
10.5
10.0-
9.5-
10 20 30 40
Time—
-'1 = June 1978 contract in March 1978, 2 = June 1978 contract in April
1978, 3 = June 1978 contract in tfey 1978, 4 = June contract in June
1978, 5 = September 1978 contract in June 1978 and so on.
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fipfih Tntprest Ratps. Federal Land Bank interest rates on farm real
estate loans are uniform across all operating FIB's in the 9th Farm Credit
District and are based on the average cost of loan funds. 8 The FIB's
obtain loan funds through the sale of FIB bonds in the U.S. money
investment market. FIB bonds are normally issued quarterly with different
maturities and issue rates. For example on July 23, 1984, bonds maturing
January 20 1987, January 20, 1989 and January 20, 1992 were issued. Yields
were 13.20 percent, 13.70 percent, and 13.75 percent respectively.
Variable rate loans with maturities of 5 to 40 years are made as well as 5
year fixed rate loans. The interest rate on a variable rate loan can
change the first day of any month during the loan period and is based on
the current average cost of funds for the District. The interest rate of
the 5 year fixed rate loan is set based on the cost of funds from a special
issue of FIB bonds. The size of the bond issue which provides funds for
the 5 year fixed rate loan is made based on prior borrower committments.
In other words, the borrower does not know his interest rate until after he
is committed to the loan.
The PCA interest rate in this study is the base rate charged to each
member PCA in the 9th Farm Credit District by the Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank (FICB) of Wichita Kansas. This rate is the same for all member
PCA's. Each separate PCA then charges its customers this base rate plus a
given "operating" spread, which depends on the size and structure of the
individual PCA. Operating spreads were between .75 and 3 percent. The base
^This study does not include the impact on effective interest rate of
stock purchase requirements or closing fees which, during the study period,
could varv frnm rtno PT.R t-n t-ho ravfy o one FIB to the next.
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rate, and hence the borrower's interest rate, can change on the first day
of any month during the loan period.
The FICB obtain funds principally through the sale of short-term bonds
supplemented by the sale of some intermediate-term bonds and discount
notes. Bond issues usually take place monthly with the majority of bonds
issued with 9 month maturities. Figure 10 shows average monthly interest
rates charged by FLB's and the average monthly ICA base rate from March
1978 through March 1984.
Commercial bank interest rate data are from selected Kansas
agricultural banks. 9 The rate quoted is the base agricultural loan rate.
Loan rates for individual customers are determined using the base rate and
an incorporated risk factor. The risk factor is based on such things as
the customer's past loan history, repayment capacity, financial position
and purpose for which the funds will be used. The higher the perceived
risk, the higher will be the loan rate. A banks "best" customers receive
the loan at the base rate.
The banks agricultural base loan rate is usually a fixed margin above
the individual bank's cost of funds. Commercial banks obtain loanable
funds primarily though deposits. Hence bank rates tend to reflect
competitive money market rates.
Agricultural loans made by commercial banks are set up with either
fixed or variable rates depending on the bank and the nature of the loan.
Fixed rate loans, as the name implies, are made with a guaranteed interest
rate for the life of the loan. Loans which come due in 6 or 12 months, as
9Selection based on size and geographical region. Bank size ranged
from $52.7 million to $1,464.1 million in assets as of June 30, 1982.
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FIGORE 10
MONTHLY AVERAGE INTEREST RATES FOR FEDERAL LAM) BANK AND
PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION FARM LOANS,
MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
s 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 SO 65 70 75
Time^'
Legend: Federal Land Bank = +, Production Credit Association = *
-'1 = March 1978, 2 = April 1978 and so on to 73 = March 1984.
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well as longer term loans of 3-5 years are available at fixed rates at seme
commercial banks. Conversely, a variable rate loan is one in which the
interest rate charged to the borrower can change during the life of the
loan. Usually the variable loan rate follows the individual bank's base
rate. This type of loan can be offered with the interest rate adjusted
daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or annually.
The commercial banks were separated into two categories on the basis
of interest rate volatility: commercial money center banks and commercial
rural banks. Commercial money center banks are the larger, correspondent
banks whose agricultural loan rates tend to more closely follow the
national money market prime loan rate. The overall mean interest rate
charged to agricultural producers by money centers was not significantly
different from the mean interest rate charged to agricultural producers by
the typically smaller rural banks. However, the standard deviation for the
money center banks interest rate was 3 .4 while rural banks interest rates
exhibited a standard deviation of 2.6. Coefficient of variations were 25
and 18 respectively. Figure 11 shows the monthly average interest rate
levels of commercial money center banks and commercial rural banks for the
study period. Money center banks registered the highest monthly average
rate of 20.08 percent in October 1981, while the rural banks highest
monthly average rate of 18.75 percent was recorded in September 1981.
Correlati on Analysis
According to Moens, correlation must be high between the cash and
futures instruments movements for effective cross-hedging to take place
[Moens, p. 56] . Correlation measures the closeness of a linear
relationship between two variables. When the variables are highly
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FIGURE 11
MONTHLY AVERAGE INTEREST RATES FOR MONEY CENTER BANK AND
RURAL BANK FARM LOANS, MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
Rural Bank
Legend: Money center bank = +, rural bank
a/
1 = March 1978, 2 = April 1978 and so on to 73 = March 1984
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correlated, their points tend to fall on or near a line of fit. A perfect
linear relationship is equivalent to a correlation of one. Table 4 gives
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for each of the four cash
instruments and T-bond yields.
TABLE 4
PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX FOR STUD? VARIABLES
(CASH MARKET INTEREST RATE HJD U.S.TREASURY BOND FUTURES YIELD)
FLB £ca
Money
Ssoisis.
Rural
Banks
T-Bond
Yield
fi£ 1.000
(.0000)
0.823
(.0001)
0.418
(.0001)
0.767
( .0001)
0.819
(.0001)
PCA 1.000
(.0000)
0.779
(.0001)
0.932
(.0001)
0.850
(.0001)
Money
Centers
1.000
(.0000)
0.889
(.0001)
0.719
(.0001)
Rural
Banks
1.000
(.0000)
0.916
(.0001)
T-Bond
XLsisi
1.000
(.0000)
Figures in parenthesis are significance probabilities. If the value is
small, significance is indicated.
Correlation values range from a low correlation of .72 between T-bond
yields and conmercial money center rates to a high correlation of .92
between commercial rural bank rates and T-bond yields. Correlation
coefficients between PCA rates and T-bond yields and FLB rates and T-bond
yields are .85 and .82 respectively. Significance probabilities indicate
that all correlation coefficients were highly significant. While no cash
interest rate moves in perfect unison with T-bond futures yields,
correlations are high. Each of these cash interest rates moves in a manner
similar to T-bond futures yields.
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Standard Deviation Cross-Hedge Test
Cross-hedging potential was evaluated by comparing the standard
deviation of the cost paid to acquire cash funds (interest rates) to the
standard deviation of basis between such cash costs and futures market
yields. If the standard deviation of the basis is considerably less than
the standard deviation of the cash interest rate, a good cross-hedge might
be effected [Moens, p. 76] . In this study, the standard deviations of PCX,
FIB, commercial money center bank and commercial rural bank rates are
compared to the basis between these rates and T-bond futures yields. For a
perfect cross-hedge, i.e. no basis risk, the standard deviation of the
basis would be zero. As the cash market rates increase (decrease) , T-bond
yields would increase (decrease) by an identical amount.
Table 5 gives standard deviations for PCR, FLB, money center bank and
rural bank interest rates and the basis between each of these four cash
rates and T-bond futures yields. While no basis exhibits the standard
deviation of zero necessary for a perfect hedge, the standard deviations of
the basis are considerably lower than the standard deviations of cash
instrument rates. Since the standard deviation of the basis between each
of the cash instruments and T-bond yields is lower than the standard
deviation of the cash instrument across all T-bond contracts, successful
cross-hedging may be accomplished.
Table 6 lists interest rate coefficients of variation and means for
the four cash instruments and their corresponding basis. It is evident
that the relative variation in basis, as measured by the coefficient of
variation (C.V.), is considerably higher for FIB's and PCA's than for
commercial money center or rural banks. The C.V. may be useful for
TABLE 5
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MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN BASIS AND CASH INTEREST RATES,
FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
FIB
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Contract Month Deviation Deviation
March 11.01 1.51 - .59 1.06
June 10.85 1.67 - .09 1.04
September 10.98 1.57 - .12 0.90
December 10.93 1.63 - .29 1.09
All Months 10.94 1.57 - .29 1.03
PCA
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Contract Month Deviation Deviation
March 11.46 1.55 - .14 0.79
June 11.25 2.26 .30 1.16
September 11.33 2.25 .21 1.27
December 11.31 2.06
'
.02 0.98
All Months 11.34 2.02 .10 1.07
MONEY CENTER BANKS
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Contract Month Deviation Deviation
March 14.22 3.29 2.83 2.80
June 13.59 3.90 2.60 2.60
September 13.70 3.24 2.59 2.50
December 13.58 3.00 2.29 2.25
All Months 13.61 3.41 2.37 2.46
RURAL BANKS
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Contract Month Deviation Deviation
March 14.60 2.23 3.01 1.65
June 14.16 3.20 3.21 1.57
September 14.30 2.66 3.18 1.35
December 14.15 2.41 2.86 1.00
All Months 14.21 2.69 2.97 1.28
TABLE 6
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MEANS AND COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION FOR BASIS AND CASH INTEREST RATES,
FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
FLB
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Coefficient mean Coefficient
Contract Month of- Variation of Variation
March 11.01 13.71 - .59 - 179.66
June 10.85 15.39 - .09 -1115.47
September 10.98 14.26 - .12 - 714.28
December 10.93 14.95 - .29 - 310.65
All Months 10.94 14.37 - .29 - 354.80
PCA
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient
Contract Month of Variation of Variation
March 11.46 13.53 - .14 - 576.47
June 11.25 20.12 .30 382.42
September 11.33 19.92 .21 587 .87
December 11.31 18.24 .02 565.20
All Months 11.34 17.84 .10 1069.22
MOJEy CENTER BANKS
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient
Contract Month of Variation of Variation
March 14.22 23.14 2.83 107.42
June 13.59 28.80 2.60 98.55
September 13.70 23.66 2.59 97.58
December 13.58 22.11 2.29 97.05
All Months 13.61 25.06 2.37 103.72
RURAL BANKS
CASH RATE BASIS
Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient
.Contract Months of Variation of Variation
March 14.60 15.72 3.01 38.76
June 14.16 22.32 3.21 48.97
September 14.30 18.63 3.18 42.60
December 14.15 12.02 2.86 35.12
All Months 14.21 25.06 2.97 42.95
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comparing the variability of the basis between contract months. For
instance, the basis for the June contract under FIB's exhibits a
considerably higher C.V. (-1115.47) than does the March contract under
FIB's (-179.66) . If proven statistically significant, this would imply
less basis risk in FIB interest rate hedges using the March T-bond futures
contract than in FIB hedges using the June T-bond futures contract.
Variability Differences in T-bond Contracts
Because this study encompasses the potential use of any of the four
T-bond contract months currently being traded on the Chicago Board of Trade
to hedge interest rate risk, the question of whether or not there is a
"best" contract month to use in constructing the hedge is raised. Table 7
gives results of an analysis of variance procedure which compared the basis
variability of the four T-bond futures contract months as measured by
maximum changes within each year. The results show that there is no
significant difference in basis variability between the T-bond futures
contract months for FIB's, PCA's, money center banks or rural banks. This
implies that it will be possible to use either the March, June, September,
or December T-bond futures contract to construct interest rate hedges with
similar effectiveness in hedging results being observed.
Baala Anaiy«Ha
An effective job of hedging cannot be done without knowing the size
and predictability of the basis. Cash and futures prices tend to move in
the same direction in roughly parallel patterns, although not perfectly as
shown in the correlation analysis discussed earlier in this chapter.
Changes in the basis between cash interest rates and futures market yields
tend to be more stable than either the cash interest rate or futures market
TABLE 7
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR COMPARISON OF U.S. TREASURY
BOND FUTURES CONTRACT M3NTH BASIS VARIABILITY
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FLB
Contract Month
March
Mean a/
0.87
Grouping b/
A
June 1.23 A
September
December
1.20
1.06
A
A
PCA
Contract Month
March
Mfian.3/
1.05
Grouping b/
A
June 1.23 A
September
December
1.04
0.80
A
A
MONEY CENTER BANKS
Contract Month
March
Mean 3/
1.20
Grouping b/
A
June 1.31 A
September
December
1.84
2.33
A
A
RURAL BANKS
Contract Month Mean V
0.86
Grouping b/
AMarch
June 0.93 A
September
December
1.21
0.89
A
A
3/ First difference means.
b/ Means with same grouping are not significantly different.
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yield movements. Understanding basis relationships is the key to effective
hedging [Chicago Board of Trade, 1980(a), p. 38].
Figures 12 through 15 present cash interest rates along with the basis
between the cash instrument interest rate and T-bond futures yields for
PCA's, FIB's, commercial money center banks, and commercial rural banks
respectively. It can be seen, that in general, the basis follows interest
rate trends.
By regressing the basis between T-bond futures contract yield and cash
interest rates against the cash interest rate, it is possible to determine
the direction of basis movement as interest rates rise or fall. Regression
results indicate that for money center banks, rural banks and PCA's, cash
interest rate is a significant factor in determining the basis (Table 8)
.
Slope coefficients are highly significant for money center banks, rural
banks and PCA's at .62, .39 and .25 respectively for the all options
catagories. K-squares were high for money center and rural banks with
changes in the money center bank rate explaining 75 percent of the change
in money center basis, while changes in rural bank rate explained 68
percent of the change in rural bank basis. The PCA's exhibited a
considerably lower K-square of .22.
It can be seen from Table 8 that FIB interest rates are not a
significant factor in determining the basis between T-bond futures yields
and FIB interest rates. The low t-value of 1.08 indicates that the slope
of the regression line is not significantly different from zero. This may
be in part, due to the fact that the data used in this study does not
reflect the effects of FIB stock purchase requirements or closing fees on
effective FIB interest rates.
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FIGURE 12
MONTHLY AVERAGE FEDERAL LAND BANK FARM INTEREST RATE AND BASIS
BETWEEN FEDERAL LAND BANK INTEREST RATE AND U.S. TREASURY
BCND FOTORES YIELD, MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
/
i 1 1 1 1 1
1
Federal Land Bank
Basis -
O 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 '5 50 55 60 65 '0 '5
Time-
Legend: Federal Land Bank = +, Basis = *
-'1 = March 1978, 2 = April 1978 and so on to 73 = March 1984.
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FIGURE 13
MONTHLY AVERAGE PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION FARM INTEREST RATE AND
BASIS BETWEEN PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION INTEREST RATE AND
U.S. TREASURY BOND FUTURES VIELD, MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
Basis-
TimeS-'
Legend: Production Credit Association = +, Basis
a/
1 March 1978, 2 = April 1978 and so on to 73 = March 1984.
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FIGURE 14
MONTHLY AVERAGE MONEY CENTER BANK FARM INTEREST RATE AND BASIS
BETWEEN MONEY CENTER BANK INTEREST RATE AND U.S. TREASURY
BOND FUTURES YIELD, MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
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Legend: Money center bank = +, Basis = *
= 1 = March 1978, 2 = April 1978 and so on to 73 = March 1984.
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FIGURE 15
MONTHLY AVERAGE RURAL BANK FARM INTEREST RATE AND BASIS
BETWEEN RURAL BANK INTEREST RATE AND U.S. TREASURY
BOND FUTURES YIELD, MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
Basis
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Tiae^
Legend: Rural bank = +, Basis = *
-'1 = March 1978, 2 = April 1978 and so on to 73 = March 1984.
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TABLE 8
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE BASIS BETWEEN U.S. TREASURY BOND
YIELDS AND CASH INTEREST RATES CN CASH INTEREST
RATES FOR VARIOUS FARM LENDING SOURCtS
FLB
Slope
Contract. Month Intercept Coefficient R-sqiiare 2/
March -3.00 0.22 .06
(-1.9) (1.54)
June -0.55 0.54 -.04
(- .38) (0.32)
September 1.23 -0.12 .003
(0.93) (-1.0)
December -2.22 0.17 .02
(-1.5) (1.24)
All Months -1.08 .07 .002
(-1.46) (1.08)
PCA
Slope
R-sqnare VContract Month Intercept Coefficient
March -1.65 0.13 .02
(-1.4) (1.25)
June -2.80 0.28 .26
C-2.7)Ja/ (3.00)12/
September -2.94 0.28 .21
(-2.4)12/ (2.66)V
December -3.01 0.27 .28
(-3.1)V (3.17)V
All Months -2.74 0.25 .22
(-5.0)^7 (5.25)fc/
Figures in parenthesis are t-values
w Adjusted R-square.
fc/ Significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
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MCNEY CENTER BANKS
Slope
R-square S/Contract Month Intercept Coefficient
March -8.17 0.76 .11
(-€.5)^2/ (8.80)12/
June -5.54 0.60 .81
(-6.5)12/ (10.0)12/
September -5.15
,
0.54 .72
(-5.3)12/ (7.66)12/
December -6.01 0.61
,
.67
(-4.8)12/ (6.84)12/
All Months -6.12 0.62 .75
(-11.7)12/ (16.69)12/
RURAL BANKS
Slope
R-square VContract Month Intercept Coefficient
March -2.76 0.39 .55
(-2.6)12/ (5.42)12/
June -3.04 0.44 .78
(-4.3)12/ (9.04)12/
September -2.50 0.38 .71
(-3.5)V (7.57)12/
December -1.85 0.33 .62
(-2.4) (6.22)12/
All Months -2.61 0.39 .68
(-6.60)12/ (14.34)12/
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The way in which the basis is affected by rising or falling interest
rates can be analyzed using graphical and numerical examples.
Hie regression equation for rural center banks for all options from
Table 8 is:
Basis = -2.61 + .39 (x) +
R-square = .68 t-value = 14.34
The dependent variable (basis) is the yield on the T-bond futures
contract less the rural bank interest rate. The independent variable (x)
is the FIB interest rate. Figure 16 shows this regression line.
The regression line illustrated suggests that as rural banks interest
rates rise (fall) the basis will strengthen (weaken) . If, for instance, at
t = the rural bank rate is 15 percent, the regression equation estimate
of the basis between T-bond futures yields and rural bank fates would be:
3.24% = -2.61% + .39 (15%). This implies a corresponding T-bond futures
yield of 11.76 percent. If at t = 1 the rural bank interest rate has risen
to 16 percent, the new regression equation estimate of the basis would be:
3.63 = -2.61 + .39 (16%) . The implied T-bond futures yield would thus be
12.37 percent. Likewise, if at t = 2 the rural bank interest rate fell to
14 percent, the regression equation estimate of the basis would be: 2.85%
= -2.61 + .39 (14%). This implies a corresponding T-bond futures yield of
11.15 percent. Movements are shown in Figure 17.
With rising rural bank rates from 15 to 16 percent, the basis has
strengthened from 3.24 percent to 3.63 percent. A producer making a short
cross-hedge would have not been able to exactly offset his cash market risk
by using an equal dollar amount of T-bond futures contracts due to this
basis change. The following represents the hypothetical transactions which
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FIGURE 16
EXAMPLE REGRESSION LINE, FIRST DIFFERENCES OF MONTHLY AVERAGE
RURAL BANK INTEREST RATES ON FIRST DIFFERENCES OF MONTHLY
AVERAGE U.S. TREASURY BOND FUTURES YIELDS FOR THE
PERIOD MARCH 1978 TO MARCH 1984
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FIGURE 17
CHANGES m BASIS BETWEEN U.S TREASURY BCND FUTURES YIELD
AND RURAL BANK RATE AS RURAL BANK RATES RISE
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would have taken place if a producer had implemented a short cross-hedge to
"lock-in" a rural bank rate.
Cash Market Futures Market Basis
t=0 Borrower anticipates
rising interest rates.
Decides to "lock-in"
current 15% rate because
he feels interest rates
will rise.
t=l Borrower takes out
loan. Interest rate
is now 16%
Sells 1 T-bond futures
contract.
Yield = 11.76%
3.24%
Offsets futures position 3.63%
by buying back 1 T-bond
contract. Yield is now
12.37%
Opportunity loss = 1%
Effective loan cost = 15.39%
Futures gain = .61%
The hedger did not lock in a 15 percent interest rate but did manage to
successfully offset a substantial portion of his increased cash cost by
using a short cross-hedge. As rural bank rates rose by one percentage
point, the basis between T-bond futures yields and rural bank rates rose by
.39 percentage points. By using SI of T-bond futures to hedge each dollar
borrowed from a rural bank, the producer offset 61 percent of his increased
cash borrowing costs.
The behavior of the basis with declining cash market interest rates
could be analyzed in a similar manner, as could the regression results of
each of the other cash instruments.
It is important to note that the basis movement for PCA's, commercial
money center banks, and commercial rural banks with rising interest rates
is unfavorable to the short cross-hedger. With the basis movement, the
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cash opportunity loss was not fully offset in the futures market.
Conversely/ with falling rates the projected basis change would be to the
hedgers advantage. For instance f in the previous example, if cash interest
rates fell to 14 percent instead of rising as anticipated by the borrower,
the following transactions would have resulted.
Cash Futures Basis
t=0 Borrower anticipates
rising interest rates.
Decides to "lock-in"
current 15% rate because
he feels interest rates
will rise before loan
closing date
t=l Borrower takes out loan.
Instead of rising rates
as anticipated, rates
have fallen. Interest
rate is now 14%
Sell 1 T-bond contract 3.24%
Yield = 11.76%
Offsets futures position 2.85%
by buying back 1 T-bond
contract. Yield is now
11.15%
Opportunity gain = 1%
Effective loan cost = 14.61%
Futures loss = .61%
The basis weakened as cash rates fell. The basis movement with falling
cash rates offset part of the potential futures market loss. The direction
in which the cash interest rates moves indicates the direction in which the
basis will move.
Optimal Hedging Ratio
Information presented in the previous section indicates that while
cash interest rates and T-bond futures yields move in the same direction,
they do not move in a one-to-one relationship. This lack of parallel
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movement implies a variable basis which leaves a hedger open to basis risk.
It is, however, possible to establish a hedge that will minimize this basis
risk. Based on current research, Luethold recommends regressing the first
differences of the cash market rate on to the first differences of the
futures market yield to determine the relationship of the change in cash
interest rate for each one percent change in T-bond futures yield
[Luethold, 1984]. In this study the first differences of FIB, PCA,
commercial money center banks and commercial rural bank rates, were
regressed on to the first differences of T-bond futures yields.
The regression of the first differences gives a slope coefficient
which indicates the size of the futures position needed to offset the
variation in the cash position. This slope coefficient, or "optimal"
hedging ratio, facilitates the minimization of basis risK for the hedger.
For instance, when using the March T-bond contract to establish an interest
rate hedge for a PCA loan, an optimal hedging ratio of .79 suggests that
basis risk will be minimized by hedging each dollar of cash debt with .79
dollars of T-bond futures.
Regression results are listed in Table 9. Slope coefficients
correspond to optimal hedging ratios. Optimal hedging ratios are given
both by T-bond contract and for all contracts combined. Regressions for
the All Months category are based on the continuum of 96 monthly average
yields for successive nearby T-bond futures contracts and corresponding
cash interest rates. Regressions for the March, June, September, and
December T-bond futures options were calculated using only the monthly
average yields for the nearby months in which that contract was traded and
corresponding cash interest rates.
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TABLE 9
OPTIMAL HEDGING RATIO COEFFICIENTS FOR U.S. TREASURY BOND FUTURES
CONTRACTS AND VARIOUS FARM LOAN CASH INSTRUMENTS
FLB
Slope
R-Square 2/Contract Month Intercept Coefficient
March 0.11 0.06 -.03
(1.06) (0.44)
June 0.14 0.86 .02
(1.63) (1.15)
September 0.04 0.58 .20
(0.31) (2.55)
December 0.08 0.27 .07
(0.68) (1.64)
All Months 0.02 0.42 .31
(0.24) (6.59)b/
PCA
Slope
Contract Month • Intercept Coefficient R-sauaze */
March 0.03 0.42 .20
(0.24) (2.54)
June 0.07 0.40 .27
(0.47) (3.21)V
September -.08 1.42 .43
(-.04) (4.23)V
December 0.00 0.68 .24
(.005) (2.84)V
All Months 0.00 0.65 .42
(-.01) (8.26)V
Figures in parenthesis are t-values
3/ Adjusted R-square.
V Significant at 99 percent confidence level.
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MCNEY CENTER BANKS
Slope
Contract Month Intercept Coefficient R-square sJ
March -.16 1.05 .23
(-.57) (2.85)12/
June -.09 1.79 .69
(-.33) (7.06)13/
September -.22 2.42 .49
(-.06) (4.70)13/
December 0.01 0.38 -.01
(0.36) (0.79)
All Months -.042 1.18 .39
(-.28) (7.78)12/
RURAL BANKS
Slope
R-square a/Contract Month Intercept Coefficient
March .018 .789 .32
(0.10) (3.40)12/
June .046 1.06 .67
(0.26) (6.74)ia/
September -.06) 1.78 .51
(-.31) (4.85)12/
December 0.67 0.69 .29
(0.43) (3.08)12/
All Months 0.00 1.08 .61
(-.03) (12.35)12/
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This study will emphasize the use of optimal hedging ratios determined
in regressions using all contract months. Since there is no statistically
significant difference in basis variability between T-bond futures contract
months, equally effective hedges could be established regardless of the
T-bond futures contract used. An additional reason for emphasizing the all
contract months regression results is that the 96 observations used to
calculate the All Months category gives highly significant values for the
optimal hedging ratio, while the smaller data series used to calculate
individual contract month regressions suggest considerably less significant
hedging ratios. T-values for the All Months category for FIB, PCA, money
center banks and rural banks indicate that values for the optimal hedging
ratios (slope coefficients) are all highly statistically significant.
Although high t-values indicate that optimal hedging ratios for the
All Months categories are highly significant, low R-squares imply that
there is a considerable amount of variation in cash interest rates that is
not explained by movements in T-bond futures yields. The regression
equations show that cash interest rates should be thought of as having two
independent components, one related to T-bond futures yields and the other
a random component about which T-bond futures yields give no information
[Krasker, p. 67] . Since T-bond futures yields give the borrower no
information about the random component, the best the borrower can do is to
sell T-bond futures to nuetralize the risk of changing cash interest rates
related to changing T-bond futures yields.
The objective of the hedger is to structure a hedge such that there
are equal dollar movements in the cash and futures positions even if the
changes in cash interest rates and T-bond futures yields are not equal.
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Using optimal hedging ratios from the regression results suggests the
following:
Dollars in cash position
Cash
Instrument
Optimal
Hedginq Ratio
effectively hedged by one
($100.0001 T-bond contract
FIB .42 $238,100
SS& .65 $153,850
Money Center Banks 1.18 $ 84,750
Rural Banks 1.08 $ 92,590
For example, to effectively hedge $100,000 borrowed at FIB rates would
require .42 T-bond futures contracts. Restated, since it is not possible
to buy or sell fractions of a futures contract, the gains or losses from
interest rates variability incurred while holding a $238,100 FIB loan can
be offset by cross-hedging with a $100,000 T-bond futures contract.lO
It is important to note that the use of optimal hedging ratios in
establishing hedges does not preclude the possibility of basis gains or
losses. The low R-squares exhibited by the regressions of FIB's (.31),
PCA's (.42) and commercial money center banks (.39) indicate that a large
portion of the variability in these interest rates is caused by a random
factor against which the optimal hedge does not provide protection. The
considerably higher R-square shown by the regression of rural banks (.61)
suggests a higher degree of efficiency should be attainable when
establishing hedges using this rash instrument.
10Loans for one half of the dollar cash position listed above could be
effectively hedged using $50,000 "mini" T-bond contracts traded on the
MidAmerica Commodity Exchange.
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Dollar Equivalency
The optimal hedging ratio relates the movements between the cash and
futures instruments and indicates the size of the T-bond futures position
needed to offset the variation in the cash position. However, it is also
necessary to take into account the length of time each of the instruments
is held. Tailoring the hedge to fit the loan maturity requires the hedger
to balance the gains (losses) from holding T-bond futures over time with
the losses (gains) associated with the cash position over time.
A movement in a T-bond futures yield results from a change in the
selling price of the T-bond contract. Hence, a futures yield increase or
decrease implies an absolute change in the dollar value of the futures
contract. That change in value is equal to the change in yield multiplied
by the contract face value and is not dependent on a 'time factor.11 A one
percentage point change in futures yield is equivalent to a $1,000 change
in the trading price of a Chicago Board of Trade T-bond futures contract.
The dollar change is the same whether this movement took place over one
month or one year.
The dollar value of a one percentage point change in the interest rate
of an agricultural loan on the other hand is dependent on the time over
which that change is in effect. A one percent interest rate change on a
$100,000 loan for one year is equivalent to a $1,000 change in interest
cost. If the loan were for six months however, interest cost would change
only $500. Consequently, in addition to the optimal hedging ratio, it is
llAll T-bond futures contracts are standardized. For trading purposes
the maturity date for a specific futures contract month is assumed to be
the same regardless of when that T-bond futures contract is traded.
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necessary to adjust the number of futures contracts traded to account for
the maturity of the loan. The following formula can be used to determine
the number of T-bond futures contracts required for dollar equivalency of
the cash and futures positions.
X = CUR y LPB y Maturity717.
Face Value of Futures Contract
where:
X = number of T-bond futures contracts required to obtain dollar
equivalency of cash market interest rate changes and TV-bond yield
changes.
OHR = Applicable optimal hedging ratio for lending institution.
LPB = Cash loan principal balance.
Maturity = Length of time in months that cash position is held.
Face Value of Futures Contract = $100,000 for Chicago Board of
Trade T-bond futures contracts or $50,000 for MidAmerica
Commodity Exchange "mini" T-bond futures contracts.
The following example illustrates the use of this formula.
A farmer plans on summer grazing 400 head of steers. The steers are
projected to cost $450 per head. He plans to purchase the steers on May 1
and to hold them for 6 months. Loan funds for the purchase cost will be
obtained from a rural bank and repaid when the steers are sold. It is now
February 1 and interest rates are projected to rise. The farmer decides to
hedge his projected loan needs of $180,000 (400 head x $450 per head) in
order to "lock-in" the current rate. How many Chicago Board of Trade
T-bond futures contracts should the farmer sell February 1 to implement the
hedge?
.97 = 1.08 x 180.000 x fi/12
100,000
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Since it is not possible to purchase or sell fractions of a futures
contract, the number of contracts required would be rounded to one. Cn
February 1 the farmer would sell one T-bond futures contract to lock-in the
current rural bank rate.
If in the above example the farmer decided to hold the steers for 9
months, 1.46 T-bond futures contracts would be needed. This is calculated
as follows:
1.46 = 1.08 x 180.000 x 9/12
100,000
If only one $100,000 Chicago Board of Trade T-bond futures contract were
used, a significant portion of the cash debt would be unprotected from
interest rate risk. Cn the other hand, if two T-bond futures contracts
were used the farmer would, in effect, be in a speculative position on .54
of a T-bond futures contract. In this case, the farmer could round the
futures requirement to 1.5 T-bond contracts. He would sell one regular
T-bond contract on the Chicago Board of Trade and one "mini" contract on
the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange or sell three "mini" contracts.
T-bond futures contract requirements such as 2.78 or .67 require the
hedger to make futures contract transaction decisions that will either
leave a portion of the debt unhedged and thus unprotected from interest
rate risk, or put the hedger in a speculative position. Speculators use
the futures market to assume price risk in pursuit of potential profits.
The hedger uses the futures market as a means of protection from
unpredictable and potentially damaging price changes. [Chicago Board of
Trade, 1980(a), p. 10]. By taking a speculative position, the hedger would
assume a portion of the price risk he sought to avoid by hedging. Total
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risk may be minimized by rounding to the nearest purchaseable futures
contract. The futures contract requirements of 2.78 and .67 could be
rounded to 3.0 and .5 (one "mini" contract) respectively.
Summary
The discussion in this chapter explored the mechanics and the
feasibility of farmer interest rate hedging. Several cross-hedging tests
were used to examine the cross-hedging potential for agricultural loans
from FIB's, PCA's and two classes of commercial banks. Interest rates on
agriculture loans from these lenders were found to be highly correlated
with T-bond futures yields. This implied that movements in agricultural
loan interest rates and T-bond futures are responsive to similar underlying
factors. The standard deviation of the basis between the cash loan rate
and T-bond futures was found to be less than the standard deviation of the
cash interest rates for each of the lenders considered. This suggests the
possibility for successful hedging since the risk associated with changes
in basis assumed while hedging is less than the risk associated with
holding the unhedged cash position.
Having determined that the potential for successful interest rate
hedging does exist, the basis was examined in more detail. For PCA's,
money center banks and rural banks, the basis was found to strengthen as
interest rates rose. FIB interest rates showed no predictable basis
movement with changing interest rates.
Analysis of variance of basis suggested that no statistically
significant difference in basis variability exists between contract months.
Hence, any contract month can be used without significantly influencing
hedging effectiveness.
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Regression analysis helped to determine the combination cash/futures
position necessary to minimize basis risk. The Beta coefficient from the
regressions gave the risk minimizing optimal hedging ratio.
Finally, a method was developed for matching T-bond futures
requirements with the cash loan maturity. This method involved the use of
a dollar equivalency formula which takes into account the length of time
each instrument is held plus the optimal hedging ratio and gives the number
of T-bond futures contracts required to offset cash market interest rate
risk.
The following chapter will utilize the information and evidence
gathered in this chapter to construct actual cross-hedging examples.
CHAPTER 4
APPLICATIONS
There exists the potential for a farmer to cross-hedge interest rates
in order to reduce risk associated with changing interest rates. Although
the likelyhood of perfect hedge is small because of basis risk, the basis
between T-bond futures and cash rate for FLB, PCA, money center and rural
bank lenders is less variable than is the cash rate. In the long run, the
farmer would gain from cross-hedging his agricultural loans with T-bond
futures.
Cost of Hedging
When considering whether or not to hedge the farmer must understand
both the mechanics of hedging as well as the costs associated with hedging.
Two types of cost should be considered: execution costs and transaction
costs.
Execn±ion Costs . Execution costs are represented by basis risx. The
agricultural producer should recognize that speculation exists in hedging.
The hedger has, in essence, substituted basis risk for interest rate risk.
Even though the basis risk associated with a hedged position is
hypothesized to be less than the interest rate risk associated with holding
the unhedged cash position, the basis is still variable. Hence the hedger
is speculating on the basis.
The cross-hedger is in another sense also a speculator. If interest
rates are expected to rise, then taking a short position in the futures
market will be of benefit. But, if interest rates decline, the farmer will
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benefit by not taking a position in the futures market. Whether interest
rates rise or fall, the agricultural producer is locked into an interest
rate by hedging. While the hedged position insulates the user from
increased interest costs associated with rising interest rates, it also
prevents him from benefiting from cost reductions inherent to falling
interest rates.
Transaction Costs . Transaction costs result from the actual
implementation of the hedge. They are represented by the commission
charged by the broker for placing the hedge and by the opportunity costs of
the margin. A check with several Kansas brokers found commissions ranging
from $72 to $90 for an overnight trade12 on a $100,000 Chicago Board of
Trade T-bond futures contract. The commissions for an overnight trade on a
$50,000 mini T-bond contract traded on the HidAmerica Commodity Exchange
ranged from $45 to $60.
Margins in commodity trading act as a performance bond or earnest
money. There are two components of the margin account balance used in
financial futures trading. The initial margin component is a security
deposit guaranteeing performance and is the amount of money required to
open a financial futures trading account with a registered broker on the
commodity exchange. The maintenance margin component is an amount below
which the initial margin is not allowed to float.
The margin account balance is computed by debiting or crediting the
daily price movements of a contract to the initial margin. If the futures
12fln overnight trade involves both the initiation and liquidation of a
futures market position which is held over time. This is contrasted with
day trading which involves establishing and offsetting a position in the
same day. Day trades incur significantly lower commissions.
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contract price neves favorably to the contract holder, a surplus is built
which can be withdrawn by the contract holder. Conversely, if the market
moves against the contract holder, the margin account is reduced by tne
appropriate amount. If the account balance falls below the maintenance
margin requirement, the contract holder receives a demand for additional
margin money known as a margin call. The amount of the call equals the
initial margin requirement less the account's balance [Buchanan et al, p.
2.4].
Margin requirements are subject to change with changing price
variability. At the time of this study the initial margin per Chicago
Board of Trade T-bond futures contract was $2,500 with a maintenance margin
of $2,000. The cash balance necessary to maintain the margin account is not
itself a hedging expense. However, the opportunity cost of using the money
for margin purposes should be considered a cost. In this study the initial
margin is assumed to be borrowed at the cash market interest rate
prevailing when the hedge is established. This interest expense is
considered a hedging cost. Margin calls are not considered.
Cross-hedging Examples
It is possible to "lock-in" the anticipated interest rate prior to the
loan period (fixed rate loans) or to fix the interest rate during the time
period in which the loan is held (variable rate loans) . Hedging strategies
for interest rate risk reduction will depend upon whether the hedger is
trying to fix the interest rate before or during the loan period. The
required strategy is tailored to the loan maturity through the use of the
dollar equivalency concept.
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To facilitate the evaluation of interest rate hedging, a hypothetical.
Kansas cattle feeder with lot capacity of 8,000 head was examined.13 The
hypothetical feeder was assumed to own the cattle being fed. One thousand
thirty-three head of 600 pound steers were purchased each month, fed for
six months, and sold at a market weight of 1,056 pounds. To isolate the
effects of variability in interest rates, all prices, except interest
rates, were held fixed at January 1984 levels. Table 10 lists the expenses
considered and January 1984 price levels.
It was assumed that all funds required for the purchase, feeding and
handling of the steers were borrowed on the day tne steers were purchased.
Actual monthly average cash interest rates and T-bond futures yields from
the study period were used to construct the following cross-hedging
examples.
Fixed Rate Iran Hedging Example. On December 1, 1979 the cattle
feeder, in anticipation of rising interest rates on loans to purchase
cattle during the next three months, decided to lock-in the current
interest rate offered by his rural bank by cross-hedging with T-bond
futures contracts. The current rural bank rate was 14.19 percent. A six
month, fixed-rate note for $984,660 (1,333 head x $738.68/head) was
executed on the day each group of cattle was purchased. Each loan was
repaid six months later when the cattle were sold. Cattle purchases were
made on January 1, 1980, February 1, 1980 and March 1, 1980.
13Eight thousand head is the approximate average capacity of Kansas
feedlots of over 1,000 head capacity [Kansas Crop & Livestock Reporting
Service, p. 3]
.
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TABLE 10
GREAT PLAINS CATTLE FEEDING BUDGET
[600 LBS. TO SLAUGHTER]
Costs and Bet-urns
$403.92
Price
Non-feed Costs:
600 lb Feeder Steer $67.32/cwt
Transportation to
Feedlot (300 miles) $ 3.96 $.22/cwt/100 miles
Commission $ 3.00 $3.00/head
Vet Medicine $ 3.00 $3.00/head
Death Loss $ 5.60 1.5% of purchase
Total Non-feed Costs $419.48
Feed Costs:
Milo (1,500 lb) $ 80.10 $6.34/cwt
Com (1,500 lb) $ 93.30 $6.22/cwt
Alfalfa (800 lb) $ 56.80 $142.00/ton
Cottonseed meal (400 lb) $ 68.00 $17.00/cwt
Feed handling charge $ 21.00 $10.00/ton
Total Feed Costs $319.20
Total Feed & Non Feed $738.68
Returns:
1056 lb slaughter steer & $733.81 $69.49/cwt
[USDA, 1984(b), p. 24]
a/steers were assumed to gain 500 pounds in 180 days at 2.8 pounds per day.
Market weight = 1,100 pounds less 4 percent shrink.
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Using the optimal hedging ratio of 1.08 for rural banks, the number of
futures contracts required to offset the cash market interest rate risk for
each six month fixed rate is:
5.32 = 984.660 x 1.08 x 12/6
100,000
Since it is not possible to buy or sell fractions of a T-bond futures
contact, five $100,000 Chicago Board of Trade T-bond futures contacts were
used to establish each of the three hedges.*• To implement these hedges,
the cattle feeder instructed his broker to sell 15 March, 1980 T-bond
contracts (3 loans x 5 contracts per loan) . Each contract required an
initial margin of $2,500. Margin money was borrowed at the interest rate
prevailing at the time the hedge was implemented (14.19 percent) . An $80
commission was paid for executing each futures contract. Results of the
hedging program were:
Cash Position Futures Position Basis
December 1, 1973
Decision made to lock in
current rural bank interest
rate of 14.19% on loans of
$984, 6'Q to be made Jan. 1,
Feb. 1 and March 1, 1980.
January 1. 1980
Borrowers $984,660 for cattle
purchase.
Interest rate = 13.94%
Sells 15 March 1980
T-bond futures contacts
Yield = 10.10%
Buys 5 March 1980 T-bond
futures contracts
Yield = 10.66%
4.09%
3.28%
Decreased interest = $1,230.83 Futures gain = $2,800.00
14In this study, T-bond futures requirements will be rounded to the
nearest $100,000 Chicago Board of Trade T-bond Contract.
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Net decreased interest costs
Less commission
Less opportunity cost of margin
(5 contracts, $2,500 @ 14.19%
for one month)
Net decreased costs
Effective interest rate = 13.48%
$4,030.83
$ 400.00
$ 147.81
$3,483.02
February 1 . 1980
Borrows $984,660 for February
cattle purchase.
Interest rate = 14.50%
Increased interest = $1,526.22
Net decreased interest cost
Less commission
Less opportunity cost of margin
(5 contracts, $2,500 I 14.19% for
2 months)
Net decreased cost
Effective interest rate = 12.51%
Buys 5 March 1980
T-bond futures contracts
Yield = 12.20%
Futures gain = $10,500.00
$8,973.78
$ 400.00
S 295.62
$8,278.16
2.27%
March 1. 1980
Borrows $984,660 for March
cattle purchase
Interest rate = 15.88%
Buys 5 March 1980 T-bond
futures contracts
Yield = 12.39%
3.49%
Increased interest = $8,320.38 Futures gain = $11,450.00
Net decreased interest cost
Less commission
Less opportunity costs of margin
(5 contracts, $2,500 @ 14.19% for
3 months)
Net decreased cost
Effective interest rate = 13.73%
$3,129.62
$ 400.00
$ 443.43
$2,286.19
The January 1 transaction shows the effects of a change in basis. The
basis weakened from 4.09 to 3.28 percent. T-bond futures yields advanced
relative to cash interest rates. Instead of the feeder gaining in the cash
market and losing in the futures market as expected, the feeder gained from
the movements in both the cash and futures markets. A considerable change
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in the basis resulted in both a decrease in cash interest cost as well as a
futures market gain.
The February transaction again indicates the effect of another
favorable move in the basis. Although both cash interest rate and future
contract yield increased, the weakening of the basis from 4.09 to 2.27
percent benefitted the cattle feeder with a basis gain of $9,100 (1.82%
gain x 5 futures contracts x $100,000 per contract) . This favorable basis
change had a considerable influence on lowering the feeder's final
effective interest rate.
In the March transaction, a favorable change in basis is once again
observed. In addition to the increased cash market interest cost of
$8,320.38 being totally offset by the futures gain, a profit of over $2,200
is made on the transaction. This profit is due to the weakening of the
basis by .60 percentage points. The weakening of the basis in these
examples was contrary to expectations of basis behavior as indicated by
previous regression analysis. This is a further indicator of high basis
variability.
The three preceding interest rate hedges produced results which were
favorable to the cattle feeder. In each case his effective loan interest
cost was reduced. Relatively large reductions in loan cost resulted from
favorable basis changes. However, the possibility of adverse price and
basis movements does exist. For example, assume the same cattle feeder on
March 1, 1980 anticipates that interest rates will continue to rise instead
of begin to fall as he previously had speculated. Being well pleased witn
the success of his previous interest rate hedges, the cattle feeder decides
to "lock-in" the current rate for the cattle purchase he intends to make on
77
April 1. To implement the "lock-in" of the current rate of 15.88 percent,
the cattle feeder instructs his broker to sell 5 June T-bond futures
contracts.
Cash Position Futures Position Basis
March 1. 1980
In anticipation of continued Sells 5 June 1980 3.56%
interest rate increases, decision T-bond futures contracts
is made to lock-in current rate Yield = 12.32%
of 15.88%
April i, iaaa
Borrows $984,660 for April Buys 5 June 1980 5.86%
cattle purchase T-bond futures contacts
Interest rate = 17.18% Yield = 11.32%
Increased interest = $6,400.29 Futures loss = $5,000.00
Net increased interest cost $11,400.29
Less commission $ 400.00
Less opportunity cost of margin
(5 contracts, $2,500 @ 15.88% for
one month) $ 165.42
Net increased cost $11,965.71
Effective interest cost = 18.31%
The hedge undertaken to fix the April 1, 1980 interest rate actually
increased the cattle feeders interest costs. This was due to an
unfavorable strengthening of the basis by 2.3 percent. The cash rate
advanced relative to the futures yield. The cattle feeder experienceo both
increased interest cost in the cash market and a loss in the futures
market.
These examples illustrate how at any one point in time the variability of
the basis is a significant factor. However, over time hedging should be
beneficial in reducing interest rate risk. A summary of the hedging
results follows:
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Interest Cost per Steer
Loan Date Decreased Interest Hedaed Unhedged
January 1, 1980 S 3,483.02 $ 49.79 $ 51.48
February 1, 1980 $ 8,278.16 $ 46.20 $ 53.55
March 1, 1980 $ 2,286.19 $ 50.71 $ 58.65
June 1, 1980 -$11,965.31 $ 67.62 5 63.45
Total $ 2,082.06
Average Interest
Cost per Steer $ 53.58 $ 56.78
The cattle feeder reduced his interest cost an average of $3.20 per
steer over the hedging period. This was equal to a 5.9 percent reduction
in his interest cost on these four groups of steers over unhedged interest
cost. In this case, the cattle feeder was successful in using the futures
market to transfer a portion of his interest rate risk to other parties
(speculators)
.
Variable Interest Rate Loan Hedging Example . Instead of a fixed rate
loan, assume that on January 1, 1980 the cattle feeder obtained from a
commercial money center bank a six month, variable rate loan for the
purchase of 1,333 head of cattle he intended to feed for 6 months. The note
was for $984,660 with a variable interest rate tied to the bank's base
rate. The loan interest rate changed on the first day of each month to
match changes which took place in the bank's base rate. The current money
center bank rate was 15.34 percent. The cattle feeder felt interest rates
would rise during the loan period, forcing him to pay higher interest
charges. In order to "lock-in" and hold the current interest rate, the
cattle feeder decided to hedge. His money cost was fixed for the first
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month at 15.34 percent. To "lock-in" this rate for the remainder of the
6-month loan the cattle feeder had to lock-in the rate for February, March,
April, May and June. Each possible change in interest rate required a
hedge. Hence, to "lock-in" the variable rate loan the cattle feeder
established 5 hedges — one for each of the 5 months in which the loan rate
could change. Using the optimal hedging ratio of 1.18 for money center
banks and a maturity on each hedge of one month, one T-bond futures
contract was required to offset cash risk for each hedge.
.97 = 984.660 x 1.18 x 1/12
100,000
The cattle feeder instructed the broker to sell two March 1980 T-bond
futures contracts and three June 1980 T-bond futures contracts.15 Initial
margin money of $2,500 and a commission of $80 per contract was charged.
Hedge transactions were as follows:
Cash Position Futures Position Basis
January 1 1980
Borrows $984,660 on variable
rate loan. Decides to lock-in
current money center bank rate.
Interest rate = 15.34%
February 1. 1980
Variable rate moves to 15.88%
Increased interest cost =
$443.10
Sells 2 March 1980 T-bond 4.68%
contracts. Yield 10.66%
Sells three June 1980 T-bond 4.76%
Contracts. Yield = 10.58%
Buys one March T-bond
contract. Yield = 12.23%
Futures gain = $1,570.00
3.28%
15The March contract is the nearby contract for hedges to be lifted in
February and March while the June contract is nearby for T-bond futures
contracts to be closed out in April, May, and June.
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March 1, 1980
Variable rate moves to 18.38%
Increased interest cost =
$2,494.47
April 1, 1980
Variable rate moves to 19.50%
Increased interest costs =
$3,413.49
Hay 1. 1980
Variable rate moves to 16.50%
Increased interest costs =
$951.83
Jimp 1. 1980
Variable rates moves to 14.70%
Increased interest cost =
-$525.15
Total increased interest cost =
$5587.94
Net increased interest costs
Plus commission
Plus margin opportunity costs
(5 contracts, $2,500 @ 15.34% for
average 3 months)
Net increased costs with hedging
Net increased costs unhedged
Effective interest rate, hedged = 16.04%
Effective interest rate, unhedged = 16.47%
Buys one March T-bond 5.99%
contract. Yield = 12.39%
Futures gain = $1,730.00
Buys one June T-bond 8.18%
contract. Yield = 11.32%
Futures gain = $740.00
Buys one June T-bond 6.25%
contract. Yield = 10.25%
Futures gain = $330.00
Buys one June T-bond 3.34%
contract. Yield = 9.91%
Futures gain = -$670.00
Total futures gain =
$3,040.00
$2,547.94
$ 400.00
$ 479.38
$3,427.32
$5,587,946
Through hedging, the cattle feeder, while not locking in his target rate of
15.34 percent, did manage to reduce his increased interest costs associated
with the variable rate loan by $2,160.62.16 The fact that cash market
interest rate changes were not perfectly offset by futures changes is once
again a reflection of basis variability.
l6The fact that the perfect hedge was not obtained is consistent with
a low hedging effectiveness coefficient of .39 for money center banks
(Table 9)
.
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Similar examples could be developed for both fixed or variable rate
loans of other maturities and for variable rate loans with rate changes
taking place quarterly, semi-annually or annually. The longer the interval
between possible rate changes on a variable rate loan, the fewer hedges
which must be established. For instance, if quarterly interest rate
changes had been specified in the preceding example, the number of times
the loan rate could vary would fall from 5 to 1 (on Spril 1) . Similarly,
the shorter the interval between possible interest rate changes, the
greater will be the number of offsetting hedges required to lock-in the
initial interest rate. The benefits of interest rate risk reduction gained
from hedging a variable rate loan with frequent potential interest rate
changes, however, .may be outwieghed by commission charges and opportunity
costs of the margin associated with establishing the large number of
required hedges.
Pre-fixing a Variable Rate Loan . It is possible to combine the
methods used in the preceding examples to both "lock-in" the interest rate
on a variable rate loan prior to borrowing and to hold that rate during the
loan period. The following futures transaction would have been required if
the cattle feeder had decided on December 1, 1979 to "lock-in" and hold the
interest rate on his January 1, 1980 money center bank loan for cattle
purchases.
December 1. 1979
Sell 5 March T-bond futures contracts
(Establish Hedge to lock-in December 1 interest rate)
January 1. 1980
Buy 5 March T-bond futures contracts
(Offset December 1 lock-in)
Sell 2 March and 3 June T-bond futures contracts
(Establish Hedges to lock-in initial January 1 loan rate
for 5 possible rate changes)
82
February 1. 1980
Buy 1 March T-bond futures contract
(Offset February 1 interest rate change)
March 1. 1980
Buy 1 March T-bond futures contract
(Offset March 1 interest rate change)
flprii x, iaao
Buy 1 June T-bond futures contract
(Offset April 1 interest rate change)
May 1. 1980
Buy 1 June T-bond futures contract
(Offset May 1 interest rate change)
June 1. 1980
Buy 1 June T-bond futures contract)
(Offset June 1 interest rate change)
In January , hedges were both established and offset. The gain from closing
out the December 1 futures position offsets the increase in cash market
interest rates which took place between December 1 and January 1. At this
point, the cattle feeder had established a rate similar to the December 1
interest rate as the effective January 1 variable loan rate (basis
variability prevents perfect lock-in). However, on February 1, the
variable interest rate could change. To hold his effective interest rate
at December 1 levels through the loan's maturity, the cattle feeder
established hedges for each possible interest rate change. Without
hedging, the cattle feeder's interest expenses would have increased by
$6,433.11 over the December 1 to June 30 lock-in period. Through hedging,
the effective interest rate of the variable rate loan was lowered to 15.68
percent from an unhedged level of 16.47 percent. While not perfectly
locking-in the December 1 target rate of 15.41 percent, hedging reduced the
cattle feeders exposure to changing interest rates.
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FTB and PCA Interest Rate Hedges
Cross-hedges for FIB and PCA loans can also be constructed. These
hedges will be effective in reducing interest rate risk since the standard
deviation of the basis between the cash instrument and T-bond futures
yields is less than the standard deviation of the cash instruments (Table
5) . However, FIB hedges exhibit a low hedging effectiveness coefficient of
.31 (Table 9) . This implies that the use of FIB interest rate hedges will
be less likely to completely offset the potential users' interest rate risk
than hedges for PCA's, money center banks or rural banks.
In addition FIB loans are generally amortized. When developing
interest rate hedges for these loans, the hedger should be aware that
amortization will affect the dollar equivalency necessary to establish the
hedge. FIB loans are amortized with either a decreasing payment plan or a
level payment plan. The decreasing payment plan provides for fixed
principal payments and declining interest payments on the outstanding
principal balance. The level payment plan calls for equal payment each
year with a larger proportion of each succeeding payment representing
principal and a smaller amount representing interest. The outstanding
principal balance, and hence the number of T-bond futures contracts,
required to hedge, decreases over time with either type of amortization.
Hedging effectiveness coefficients for PCA's indicate that interest
rate hedges for PCA's will be slightly more effective than interest rate
hedges for commercial money centers. The hedging effectiveness coefficient
for PCA's at .42 (Table 9) is considerably higher than the coefficient for
FIB's. Neither FIB's or PCA's offer a hedging effectiveness coefficient as
high as the .61 found for commercial rural banks.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CCNCLUSICNS
Review of Study
The principal objective of this study was to determine the feasibility
of farmer use of interest rate hedging. Farmers are not only borrowing
more dollars, but are also financially leveraging their operations to a
greater degree than in the past. They are, in addition, facing increased
interest rate variability as monetary conditions change and as financial
institutions structure loans to pass the changing cost of funds to the farm
borrowers as those cost changes occur. Cross-hedging interest rates on
agricultural loans made to farmers by Kansas Federal Land Banks (FLB's),
Production Credit Associations (PCA's), commercial rural banks and money
center banks using U.S. Government Treasury bond (T-bond) futures contracts
was examined. These lenders are the major sources of short term operating
funds, intermediate-term capital equipment funds and long term real estate
financing for farmer borrowers. T-bond futures contracts were selected as
the cross-hedging instrument because of their market liquidity and $100,000
face value.
Based on data from March 1978 through March 1984, study results
indicated there is potential for successful cross-hedging of interest rates
on agricultural loans by farmers. Cash interest rates of agricultural
loans to farmers were found to be highly correlated with T-bond futures
yields. Correlation coefficient values ranged from a low correlation of
.72 between T-bond futures yields and money center bank interest rates to a
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high correlation of .92 between rural bank interest rates and T-bond
futures yields. Correlation coefficients were .85 and .82 between PCA
interest rates and T-bond futures yields and FIB interest rates and T-bond
futures yields respectively. High correlations indicate that each of these
cash market interest rates moves in a manner similar to T-bond futures
yields. Hence cross-hedging potential does exist.
To further examine cross-hedging potential, the standard deviations of
cash interest rates were compared to the standard deviations of the basis
between cash interest rates and T-bond futures yields. The standard
deviation of the basis is less, in all cases, than the standard deviation
of the cash interest rate. For example, the standard deviation for PCA
interest rates was 2.02, while the standard deviation of the basis between
PCA interest rates and T-bond futures yields for the same period was 1.07.
Risk associated with a change in basis is, therefore, less than the risk
associated with changes in the cash interest rate. Hence, cross-hedging
with T-bond futures should be effective in reducing the effects of interest
rate changes. While the standard deviation of the basis is less than the
standard deviation of the cash interest rates, it is not zero. Basis risk
does exist.
Since this study encompassed the potential use of any of the four
T-bond futures contract months currently being traded on the Chicago Board
of Trade (March, June, September and December), variability differences in
the basis between the four contract months were examined to determine if
contract months differed. Although coefficients of variation for basis
shows considerable differences in relative variation between contract
months for FIS's (-179.66 for tie March contract to -1115.47 for the June
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contract) and PCA's (382.42 for the June contract to 587.87 for the
September contract) , analysis of variance indicated no statistically
significant difference in basis variability in contract months for any of
the lenders. Any of the four contract months can be used to establish
interest rate cross-hedges for loans from FIB's, PCA's, money center banks
or rural banks with similar effectiveness.
Regression analysis was used to inspect the relationships between the
interest rate level and the basis level. The regression of the basis
between the cash instrument interest rate and the T-bond futures yield on
the cash instrument indicated that as interest rates rise, the basis will
strengthen (cash interest rate advances relative to the futures yield) for
PCA's, money center banks and rural banks. Based on all contract months
combined, as interest rose by 1 percentage point, basis strengthened by
.25, .62 and .39 percentage points for PCA, money center and rural banks
respectively. Regression results for FIB's showed no statistically
significant correlations between basis movements and cash interest rate
movement.
The Beta coefficient from the regression of the first differences of
the cash interest rates on the first differences of T-bond futures yields
gave the optimal hedging ratio for each of the lending institutions. The
determination of optimal hedging ratios was necessary to equate dollar
value movements in cash interest rates and T-bond contracts. Optimal
hedging ratios were .42, .65, 1.18, and 1.08 for FIB's PCA's, commercial
money center banks and commercial rural banks respectively. Ratios were
statistically significant for each of the lenders considered. Regression
R-squares indicated the highest hedging effectiveness was for commercial
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rural bank loan hedges at .61 with somewhat lower hedging effectiveness for
the other cash instruments.
The optimal hedging ratio relates the movements between the cash and
futures instruments and indicates the size of the T-bond futures position
needed to offset the variation in the cash position. However/ it is also
necessary to take into account the length of time each of the instruments
is held. A formula was developed which can be used to determine the number
of T-bond futures contracts required for dollar equivalency of the cash and
futures positions. The formula:
Number of contracts = Optimal Hedging Rati o x fLnan MaMirity/12)
Face Value of T-bond Contract
incorporated the optimal hedging ratio, maturity of the farm loan (in
months) and the face value of the T-bond contract ($100,000 for Chicago
Board of Trade futures contracts or $50,000 for MidAmerica Commodity
Exchange "mini" contracts)
.
Using the optimal hedging ratio and dollar equivalency formula, it was
determined that the minimum dollar amount of a one year fixed rate rural
bank loan which could be effectively hedged using a $100,000 Chicago Board
of Trade T-bond futures contract was $92,500. An examination of farm debt
showed that as of January 1, 1982, 28.5 percent of all U.S. farms had debts
of over $112,000. These farms, however, constituted the major farm
production sector. A significant number of potential users seems to exist.
Example interest rate hedges for a Kansas cattle feeder were
developed. A fixed rate loan example was constructed using commercial
rural bank interest rates. A variable rate loan example was developed
using money center bank rates. By hedging the fixed rate loan, the cattle
feeder reduced his interest costs 5.9 percent over unhedged interest costs
for the period examined. The variable rate loan hedge example shewed a
reduction in the cattle feeders' effective interest rate from 16.47 percent
to 16.04 percent for the period examined. Each of these cross-hedges
provided a partial offset of interest costs incurred in the cash position
and suggested it is feasible for farmers to offset increased interest rate
volatility through use of the futures market. However, these examples also
provided evidence of basis risk. Relatively large and unanticipated
changes in the basis occured. Even though basis risk is less than interest
rate risk, high basis variability may result in unanticipated futures gains
or losses.
Limitations of Study and Additional Considerations
A limitation of this study is the use of monthly average interest
rates and T-bond futures yields. Averaging dampens, to some extent, the
actual variability of daily T-bond futures price changes and potential
daily or weekly interest rate changes.
The lending institution data used in this study are somewhat location
specific. Commercial bank interest rates are from commercial banks which
primarily serve Kansas farm borrowers. FIB and PCA data were for the 9th
Farm Credit District, which encompasses Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, and New
Mexico. Therefore, coefficient results, such as the optimal hedging ratio,
may not be applicable in other areas. However, if the money markets are
efficient, and only the absolute level of cash interest rates differ, the
optimal hedging ratios should remain applicable to other areas.
A consideration in the use of interest rate hedging is the lender's
attitude toward hedging. If the farmer is dealing with a banker who does
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not understand hedging or has a negative attitude toward hedging, it is
unlikely that the farmer will be able to hedge. Since survey's show that
many bankers have elected not to use interest rate hedging themselves, this
becomes a valid concern. The availability of knowledgeable brokers to
assist the farmer in establishing interest rate hedges may also be limited
since interest rate hedging is a relatively new field.
Production skills alone are no longer enough to guarantee a farmer
financial success. Given today's more volatile money markets, financial
management and marketing skills are extremely important. Interest rate
hedging is only one tool to be considered in developing a total financial
management program. The farmer must understand the underlying factors
which influence the futures price movement as well as know how to structure
cash loans to make the best use of the futures market.
Need for Further Study
This study suggests that it is feasible for farmers to use T-bond
futures contracts in developing interest rate hedges but does not provide
specific strategies for determining when it is optimal for the farmer to
hedge. Further study is needed to determine hedging strategies to maximize
potential farmer gains from interest rate hedging. For example, how much
must interest rates be expected to increase before hedging becomes a
profitable transaction? Are there interest rate patterns that farmers
should use in developing a hedging strategy?
Costs incurred in the interest rate hedge should also be explored in
greater depth. While this study does include commission costs and the
opportunity costs of the margin, the opportunity costs of the farmer's time
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for initiating and managing the hedge should be further analyzed. The
impact of margin calls will also affect the hedging strategy.
While it is not suggested that interest rate hedging can or should be
used by all farmers, cross-hedging tests and example interest rate
cross-hedges indicated that interest rate hedging using T-bond futures
contracts can be a viable tool for reducing interest rate risk for fanners.
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ABSTRACT
Agriculture is becoming an increasingly capital intensive industry.
Farmers are borrowing more dollars as well as financially leveraging their
operations to a greater degree than in the past. They are, in addition,
facing increased interest rate variability as monetary conditions change
and as financial institutions structure loans to pass the changing costs of
funds to the farm borrower as those cost changes occur.
The primary objective of this study was to determine factors involved
in and the feasibility of farmer use of interest rate hedging. More
specifically, cross-hedging of interest rates on agricultural loans made to
fanners by Kansas Federal Land Banks (FLB's), Production Credit
Associations (PCA's), commercial money center banks and commercial rural
banks using U.S. Treasury bond (T-bond) futures contracts was examined.
Statistical analysis of data from March 1978 to March 1984 indicated
there is potential for successful cross-hedging of interest rates by
farmers. Cash interest rates paid by farmers were found to be highly
correlated with Chicago Board of Trade T-bond futures yields. The standard
deviation of the basis between cash interest rates and T-bond futures
contract yields was less for all lenders than the standard deviation of the
cash interest rate.
A regression analysis of the first difference of cash interest rates
on the first difference of T-bond futures contract yields gave the optimal
hedging ratio for each of the lending institutions. Based on the optimal
hedging ratio and loan maturity, a formula was developed to determine
the number of T-bond futures contracts required for dollar equivalency of
the cash and futures position.
using the optimal hedging ratio and dollar equivalency formula,
example interest rate hedges for a Kansas cattle feeder were developed.
Even though basis risk remained, each of the example cross-hedges provided
a partial offset of interest costs incurred in the cash position and
suggested it is feasible for farmers to offset increased interest rate risk
through use of the futures market.
